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1962] COMMENTS 1153 
NEGLIGENCE-Res lpsa Loquitur-APPLICATION TO MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AcTIONs: 1951-1961-Res ipsa loquitur, "the 
thing speaks for itself," has been the subject matter of extensive 
legal literature1 since its inception almost a century ago.2 It is 
now well settled that res ipsa loquitur is no more than an infer-
ence of negligence from circumstantial evidence}1 The doctrine 
is applicable4 if an act or occurrence is of the type that ordinarily 
would not take place without negligence, assuming the plaintiff 
has himself been passive, and if the instrumentality causing the 
harm is within the exclusive control of the defendant.5 The ap-
plication of res ipsa loquitur to the medical malpractice area has 
introduced a number of problems, both legal and philosophical, 
resulting in a wide diversity of opinion as to whether the doctrine 
should be any more sparingly applied in medical negligence cases 
than it should in cases of exploding bottles, airplane crashes or 
1 Sec, e.g., Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183 (1949). 
2 "There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur •••• " Byrne 
v. Boadle, 2 H &: C 722, 725, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (1863). 
3 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 19.11 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955). 
4 The statement of the requirements of res ipsa loquitur most often referred to is 
that of Erle, C. J., in Scott v •. London &: St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H &: C 596, 601, 159 
Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (1865). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940); PROSSER, 
op. cit, supra note 3, at 199. 
Ii Different writers have given various verbalizations to this requirement. See, e.g., 
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 199: "The apparent cause of the accident is such that 
defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it • . . ," 
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similar unexpected events.6 It is often stated that expert medical 
testimony is a prerequisite to the establishment of a malpractice 
claim, except in the clearest of cases where it can be said that "the 
result speaks for itself."7 Judicial reluctance to expand the num-
ber of cases in which expert testimony is not required has been 
the foremost obstacle to the invocation of the doctrine. The rea-
soning of the courts appears to be that, in a majority of cases of 
alleged malpractice, it is beyond the capability of a jury of laymen 
to decide whether a particular event is of the type that ordinarily 
would not take place had due care been exercised. Thus, a failure 
to fulfill the first requirement renders the doctrine unavailable. 
Whether or not such an approach is too formalistic is arguable. 
There are, however, valid arguments that can be suggested for 
permitting the use of res ipsa loquitur in the medical negligence 
field. First, although expert testimony would be desirable, it is 
often impossible to procure. The general reluctance of physicians 
to testify against one another is well known, although character-
ization of this as a "conspiracy of silence" is questionable.8 But 
regardless of the motivation for their unwillingness,9 it is clear 
that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action operates under a 
serious handicap in obtaining expert medical witnesses. Second, 
in many cases of medical or surgical treatment the knowledge of 
the facts is peculiarly within the possession of the doctor.10 More 
often than not, the plaintiff was unconscious or totally ignorant 
of the procedures that were employed. Third, the confidence and 
trust reposed in the doctor by a patient demands that the former 
come forward with some explanation of what went wrong.11 Fi-
6 In Mogensen v. Hicks, 110 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Iowa 1961), the court, in discussing 
the application of res ipsa loquitur to a case involving allergic reaction to an anesthetic, 
stated, "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be used sparingly." To the same 
general effect, see Morris, "Res Ipsa Loquitur"-Liability Without Fault, 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 
97 (1958). However, in Maki v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 264, 7 P.2d 228, 231 (1932), 
it was stated that "while the application of the doctrine is usually made in view of 
injury by machinery .•. , from its very nature as a doctrine of necessity it should apply 
with equal force in cases wherein medical and nursing staffs take the place of machinery 
and may, through carelessness or lack of skill, inflict, or permit the infliction of, injury 
upon a patient who is thereafter in no position to say how he received his injuries." 
7 Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 2d 737, 738-39, 258 P.2d 472, 474 (1953). 
8 LOUISELL 8: WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 11 14.02 (1960) and 
authorities cited therein. 
9 See id. at 11 I 4.03. 
10 See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 825, 291 P .2d 915, 923 (1955). 
11 See Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 349, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (1960). 
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nally, it is maintained that the doctrine should not be any less 
available to a plaintiff merely because he happens to be suing a 
doctor, rather than a bottle manufacturer or an airline. 
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that a physician 
is not a warrantor of cures, and, in the interest of fairness, a careful 
vigil must be maintained to insure that his liability is based upon 
fault. Because the application of res ipsa loquitur is virtually 
tantamount to success for the plaintiff,12 and because of the un-
desirability of holding a physician responsible for every untoward 
result, restrictive application of the doctrine is often urged.13 
Thus, the res ipsa loquitur medical malpractice cases bring into 
direct conflict the aims of securing a reasonable opportunity for 
redress to the innocent patient who is injured by medical treat-
ment, while at the same time protecting from liability the physi-
cian who has been free from fault. No easy solution of this di-
lemma is evident; however, an examination of how the courts 
have handled the problem during the last decade may reveal more 
clearly the nature of the problems involved and, at the same time, 
expose to the light of recent experience a few of the more popular 
theories concerning judicial treatment of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine in medical malpractice cases. 
Increasing Judicial Acceptance of Res Ipsa Loquitur? 
There has been a great deal of alarm expressed by legal writers 
about the increasing application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
to the medical malpractice area.14 The publicity given to a few 
decisions, the desire to find trends in the law, and the dire warn-
ings periodically issued by interest groups have probably all con-
tributed to this widespread belief. But the fear that the courts 
are applying the doctrine with increasing frequency and decreas-
ing deliberation seems unwarranted in light of a survey of those 
appellate decisions which dealt with the use of res ipsa loquitur 
in medical negligence cases during the period 1951-1961. 
In every case included in the survey, the applicability of the 
12 "Plaintiffs rarely lose res ipsa loquitur cases at the jury's hands, except where a 
defendant's explanation of the accident is factually very convincing (a relatively rare 
occurrence).'' 2 HARPER &: JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1099. 
13 Morris, supra note 6, at 113. 
14 E.g., Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur-A Rule of Sympathy in PROCEEDINGS, A.M.A. 
R.Ec;IONAL MEDICOLEGAL SYMPOSIUMS 66 (1961); REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE 
LAW § !10, at 214 (lid ed. 1956): Morris, supra note 6. 
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res ipsa loquitur doctrine, whether dealt with by name or not, 
was the subject matter of judicial decision, although not neces-
sarily the ratio decidendi of the particular case. All in all, ninety-
two cases arising in thirty-one different jurisdictions were ana-
lyzed and, although such a study is not all-inclusive, it does include 
all the cases that could be readily located through legal indexes and 
undoubtedly is fairly representative of all the cases actually de-
cided during this period. 
In 56.5 percent of the 92 cases studied the courts rejected the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine; in 36.9 percent they accepted it, while 
in 6.5 percent of the cases the courts discussed its applicability 
but neither accepted nor rejected the doctrine, as shown in the 
following table: 
Discussed 
but not 
Applied or 
Year Applied Rejected Rejected Total 
1951 2 5 7 
1952 2 1 8 
1953 2 7 1 10 
1954: 2 3 5 
1955 5 5 10 
1956 2 4: 2 8 
1957 5 2 2 9 
1958 4: 9 18 
1959 4 5 9 
1960 3 4 1 8 
1961 8 7 10 
34: 52 6 92 
As can be seen, there was a tendency for the number of such 
cases presented to appellate courts to increase somewhat over the 
course of the decade, although the increase is hardly startling and 
may reflect nothing more than the increase of the incidence of 
medical treatment. More importantly, there was a surprising con-
sistency throughout the decade in the rate of judicial rejection of 
the doctrine. The rate of rejection in the cases in which applica-
tion of the doctrine was either accepted or rejected ranged from 
about one-half to two-thirds of the cases in any given three-year 
period, and for most of the three-year periods the rejection rate 
varied only between 55 and 65 percent.15 And the rate of rejec-
15 By combining the data from the table in the text into three-year periods, the 
wide variations of individual years are eliminated. 
(Continued on bottom of next page) 
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tion at the end of the decade was not significantly different from 
that at the beginning. 
For the individual states there is somewhat more variation 
because of the small number of cases involved, but, even so, sim-
ilar generalizations can be made. For example, in California, 
which far surpasses any other state in the total number of res ipsa 
loquitur cases before the courts in the last decade, there have 
been 30 res ipsa loquitur-medical malpractice cases in the ten 
years since 1951. In 16 of the cases the courts applied the doctrine, 
in 12 instances it was rejected, and in two cases a final decision 
as to its applicability was not reached. 
Although there are many inferences which might be drawn 
from these figures-involving a wide range of assumptions and 
hypotheses-the reader should be cognizant of the perils involved 
in making facile conclusions about what is going on in the trial 
courts from a tally of results in appellate court decisions. While 
it might be said that appellate cases are merely a reflection of trial 
court problems, there is no necessary correlation between the 
number or proportion of appellate applications of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine and the number of cases in which the doctrine 
is applied in the trial courts. Even farther removed from the 
realm of valid inference is the number of instances in which a 
claim is made against a physician for malpractice where there is 
no direct evidence of negligence and the case is settled before a 
suit is filed. Nevertheless, although one ,must be careful not to 
over-generalize, appellate decisions can tell us a good deal. At 
the very least, it can be said that there is nothing in the data to 
support the charge that the courts are moving rapidly in the di-
15 (Continued) 
Cases Deciding Percent of 
Year Issue Rejections Rejections 
1951-53 19 13 68% 
1952-54 17 11 65 
1953-55 24 15 62 
1954-56 21 12 57 
1955-57 23 11 48 
1956-58 26 15 58 
1957-59 29 16 55 
1958-60 29 18 62 
1959-61 26 16 62 
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rection of increased use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the 
medical negligence area. 
The Problem of Predictability 
Of course, like all statistics, these tell us little or nothing 
about any particular case, and the foremost difficulty confronting 
the legal profession in this area of the law is the absence of any 
degree of predictability as to the application of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine to any given case which involves an allegation of med-
ical malpractice without specific evidence of negligence. To illus-
trate the problem, let us assume a not-so-hypothetical fact situa-
tion in which a patient was treated for a fractured limb by a 
physician who reduced the fracture and placed the limb in a cast 
which was so tight that the circulation of the patient's blood was 
seriously impaired, and as a result amputation of the limb was 
required. 
In Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation No. Hosps.,16 the Supreme 
Court of Oregon, on facts similar to those stated, affirmed a judg-
ment for defendant doctor, holding that res ipsa loquitur did not 
apply to malpractice cases. Yet, on substantially similar facts, the 
Iowa Supreme Court, in Daiker v. Martin,11 reversing the lower 
court, applied the doctrine. Although these cases arose in differ-
ent jurisdictions, they, nevertheless, serve as a typical illustration 
of the inconsistency discoverable in the res ipsa loquitur malprac-
tice field.18 
Because of the consequence of judicial acceptance of res ipsa 
loquitur and because of the uncertainty which has been charac-
teristic of its application to malpractice cases, many attempts have 
been made to categorize the types of cases in which the doctrine 
will apply, and those in which it will not.111 With but few excep-
tions, such classifications are of doubtful value, for not only do 
they mislead by creating an impression of being legally exclusive 
classes (which they are not), but they also tend to conceal the 
uncertainty which has been characteristic of the decisions. Their 
10 226 Or~. 616, 359 P .2d 1090 (1961). 
17 250 Iowa 75, 91 N.W.2d 747 (1958). 
18 Compare Demchuck v. Bralow, 404 Pa. 100, 170 A.2d 868 (1961), and Robinson v. 
Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A.2d 706 (1956), with Klein v. Arnold, 203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 
1960). All of these cases involved a punctured esophagus occurring during a gastroscopic 
examination. 
111 E.g., LOUISELL &: WILLIAMS, op cit. supra note 8, t 14.06. 
1962] COMMENTS 1159 
only justification seems to be for illustrative purposes, but even 
there their value is questionable because of the danger that they 
will induce unwarranted reliance on the part of the practicing 
attorney. 
One of the traditional categories where it is said that res ipsa 
loquitur will apply is when the alleged injury is to a healthy area 
remote from the area of treatment or operation.20 The rationale 
behind such a distinction appears to be that it is within the ability 
of a lay jury to say, for example, that in a spinal operation a 
patient does not, without negligence, ordinarily receive a burn 
on the abdomen.21 The Michigan Supreme Court, however, in 
affirming a judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendants, 
refused to recognize such a distinction, in a case where a patient's 
ureter was sutured (healthy area) during surgery upon the plain-
tiff for lysis of bowel adhesion and relief of bowel obstruction, de-
spite expert medical testimony to the effect that the ureter was not 
the subject matter of such an operation nor was it standard practice 
to suture it.22 The court, in reaching such a result, relied upon 
the failure of the plaintiff to produce expert testimony to the 
effect that this was negligent notwithstanding the hemorrhaging 
which purportedly created an emergency situation. Although 
Michigan denies that it applies res ipsa loquitur in any case,23 
the courts have been quite willing to accept an inference of negli-
gence from circumstantial evidence which is the legal equivalent.24 
Furthermore, there have been a substantial number of cases in 
the last decade which, although not discussing such a proposed 
category have, in essence, similarly rejected it.25 
A traditional class where it has been suggested that res ipsa 
loquitur is inapplicable is where the plaintiff has been the victim 
of an adverse result of a medical technique known to produce 
20 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 
(1957); Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W.2d 296 (1957); LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, 
op. cit. supra note 8, 1f 14.06 at 439. 
21 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy, supra note 20. 
22 Lince v. Monson, 363 Mich. 135, 108 N.W.2d 845 (1961). 
23 E.g., Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209 N.W. 835 (1926). 
24. E.g., LeFaive v. Asselin, 262 Mich. 443, 247 N.W. 911 (1933). See also Loveland v. 
Nelson, supra note 23. 
21i E.g., McDermott v. St. Mary's Hosp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A.2d 608 (1957) (bums on 
legs during contraction of uterus); Rhodes v. DeHaan, 184 Kan. 473, 337 P.2d 1043 
(1959) (injury to arm in connection with an abdominal operation); Smith v. American 
cystoscope Makers, 44 Wash. 2d 202, 266 P .2d 792 (1954) (bums and a wrenched back 
during a prostate gland operation). 
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some untoward results on occasion, notwithstanding the exercise 
of due care.26 Cases falling within such a class have been denom-
inated the so-called "calculated risk" cases. The apparent reason 
for the rejection of the doctrine in such a case is the inability to 
say that this injury is of the type that ordinarily would not occur 
without negligence.27 Multitudinous problems are involved in 
determining whether a particular treatment or operation contains 
some element of risk, the primary one being the evidentiary prob-
lem of establishing the risk itself. Whether statistics are admis-
sible for this purpose, assuming that they are available (which is 
often not the case), or whether the past experience of the defend-
ant or even of his expert witnesses are relevant, and the weight 
to accord such evaluations, are problems lacking in an easy solu-
tion. Leaving such issues aside, however, and assuming that a 
particular calculated risk is generally accepted, the recurrent ques-
tion of judicial treatment of such a case leads to the conclusion 
that uniformity of result is largely a myth.28 Exemplary of this 
position is the case of partial or complete paralysis following the 
administration of a spinal anesthetic.29 In Hall v. United States,30 
the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital as a routine obstetrical 
case. Following receipt of a spinal anesthetic, plaintiff developed 
paralysis resulting in the loss of control over her bladder, bowels 
and legs. The court, in rejecting the res ipsa loquitur principle, 
relied on the failure of the plaintiff to prove that the injury would 
not have occurred without negligence.31 However, in a case de-
cided the same year by the Supreme Court of California, res ipsa 
loquitur was applied to substantially similar facts.32 
To condemn all classifications, without recognizing that in a 
few situations there is some unanimity of opinion, is to do an 
injustice. The situation which appears to have produced the 
26 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P .2d 520 (1953); Engelking v. Carlson, 
13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d 695 (1939); Comment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 80 (1956). 
27 Comment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 80 (1956). 
28 There is a possible exception with respect to the electroshock treatment cases 
where, for the most part, there has been uniformity. See, e.g., Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 
2d 503, 254 P .2d 520 (1953); Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W .2d 992 (1946). 
29 See Comment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 80, 85 (1956). 
ao 136 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955), afj'd, 234 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1956). 
31 Accord, Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951). 
32 Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P .2d 915 (1955). See also Bauer v. Otis, 133 
Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P.2d 133 (1955); Toy v. Rickert, 53 N.J. Super. 27, 146 A.2d 510 
(1958). 
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most agreement is the so-called foreign body case, where, in gen-
eral, the courts have been willing to say that "the thing speaks 
for itself." Resort to the first requirement of the doctrine has 
been characteristic of the judicial attitude, the proposition being 
that it is within the common knowledge of laymen that surgical 
needles,33 forceps?" sponges,35 cloth sacks,36 rubber tubes,37 and 
Kelly clamps38 are not ordinarily left in a patient's body in the 
absence of negligence. However, in Landsberg v. Kolodny,39 the 
court asserted that res ipsa loquitur was rebutted by a showing 
on the part of the defendant that causing a mesh of cotton gauze 
to become embedded in the plaintiff's abdomen was attributable 
to an emergency situation and not to a lack of due care on de-
fendant's part. 
Another category which appears to contain a measure of va-
lidity is that of the mistaken diagnosis where it is generally held 
that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is inapplicable.40 The reason-
ing is not that a doctor cannot be held liable for a faulty diagnosis, 
but rather that in most cases expert testimony is a prerequisite 
to liability because "jurors and courts do not know and are not 
permitted arbitrarily to say what are the proper methods of di-
agnosing and treating human ailments."41 Thus, support for a 
classification is once again sought in the first requirement of res 
ipsa loquitur, resulting in the possibility that a court might, on 
the proper set of facts, be willing to say that even a lay juror 
would know that a particular erroneous diagnosis would not or-
dinarily occur in the absence of negligence.42 
The inadequacy of the attempted classifications and the gen-
eral pattern of uncertainty characteristic of the res ipsa loquitur-
medical negligence field are attributable to a number of factors. 
Much of the confusion in this area is directly attributable to the 
33 Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P .2d 997 (1953). 
34 Swanson v. Hill, 166 F. Supp. 296 (D.N.D. 1958). 
35 Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960). 
36 Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951). 
37 Mondot v. Vallejo Gen. Hosp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 588, 313 P .2d 78 (1957). 
38 Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P .2d 36 (1956). 
30 145 Cal. App. 2d 158, 302 P.2d 86 (1956). 
40 See Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1958); LouISELL & WILLIAMS, 
op. cit. supra note 8, 1f 14.06, at 437. 
41 Crovella v. Cochrane, supra note 40, at 310. 
42 See Weintraub v. Rosen, 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937); Friedman v. Dresel, 139 Cal. 
App. 2d 333, 293 P.2d 488 (1956); Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957). 
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judicial treatment of the first requirement of res ipsa loquitur-
that the occurrence is of the type that ordinarily would not take 
place without negligence. The general proposition with which 
the courts normally begin is that expert medical testimony is a 
prerequisite in a malpractice case except where it can be said 
that a "thing speaks for itself." In deciding upon whether to 
instruct the jury on the requirements of the doctrine, the court 
must initially determine whether it believes the jury capable of 
passing upon the question of whether this result would normally 
occur in the absence of negligence. If a court determines that a 
jury of laymen is competent to answer this question upon the facts 
of a given case, instructions are then given to the effect that if the 
jury finds the three requirements to exist they are permitted to 
draw an inference of negligence. Here the court itself is, in essence, 
first determining whether this event would ordinarily take place 
without negligence. If, on the other hand, a court concludes that 
upon a particular factual situation a jury of laymen is incapable of 
resolving such a question, the request for instruction upon res 
ipsa loquitur will be denied. The two points which give rise to all 
the confusion are as follows. First, in making the initial decision 
on the question of whether a jury possesses sufficient experience to 
decide if a particular event would occur without negligence, the 
courts are substituting not merely their common knowledge, which 
in itself might not be of great consequence, but general considera-
tions concerning the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim. This results 
in the inability to say that, on any specific set of facts, the courts 
in the future will reach a similar decision. The second point giving 
rise to the confusion is the lack of clarity of reasoning by the courts 
when they decide against application of the doctrine upon a certain 
set of facts. Many courts, rather than saying that this injury does 
not speak for itself and, therefore, is not an exception to the rule 
that expert medical testimony is a prerequisite to a malpractice 
claim, state that res ipsa loquitur does not apply because there is 
no expert testimony. Such a difference may appear to be merely 
semantic, but it is not. The latter proposition not only opens up 
the possibility that expert testimony may be used to lay a founda-
tion for the application of the doctrine,43 but is also restrictive in 
nature because it tends to create an impression that expert testi-
43 See Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P .2d 85 (1953). 
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mony is a prerequisite to instruction upon the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine. 
Because of the relative paucity of res ipsa loquitur-medical mal-
practice cases being presented to the courts, elaborate suggestions 
at reformation are impractical. However, the following suggestion, 
although minimal, might alleviate some of the uncertainty and pre-
sent a more equitable approach to both the doctor and the patient. 
If a plaintiff in a malpractice action pleads res ipsa loquitur and 
the case is not one where it is quite obvious that there has been 
negligence, as in the sponge cases, the court should call an expert 
medical witness to testify solely on the question of whether this 
result would have occurred in the absence of negligence. The wit-
ness is not called upon to condemn a fellow practitioner, but merely 
to say whether such a result is an expectable one. If the witness 
(or witnesses, depending on the court's discretion) testifies that the 
injury could normally take place without negligence, res ipsa 
loquitur is inapplicable. On the other hand, if he testifies that such 
a result is somewhat extraordinary, the doctrine is applied and the 
defendant must come forward and rebut the inference. Of course, 
factual distinctions which appear to be slight may, nevertheless, 
lead to different outcomes and the present significance of the appli-
cation of the doctrine may not be diminished to any noteworthy 
degree, but such an approach would accomplish several things. 
First, it would eliminate the problems encountered by a patient 
in attempting to obtain expert testimony, at least in those cases 
where he intends to rely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Second, 
it would substitute informed objective testimony for what is often 
subjective judicial appraisal of the claim, although a court would 
certainly not be bound by the expert's testimony. Finally, by 
rationalizing the process it would hopefully add a degree of cer-
tainty and predictability to an area which is at present plagued by 
a lack of such qualities. 
Peter D. Byrnes, S.Ed. 
